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Abstract
In experimental psychopathology, construct validity is usually enhanced by addressing theories from other fields in its nomological 
network. In the field of anxiety research, this construct is related to antipredator behavior, conserved across phylogeny in its 
functions and neural basis, but not necessarily on its topography. Even though the relations between behavioral models of 
anxiety and statements from behavioral ecology and evolutionary biology are commonly made in anxiety research, these are 
rarely tested, at least explicitly. However, in order to increase construct validity in experimental anxiety, testing predictions from 
those theories is highly desirable. This article discusses these questions, suggesting a few ways in which behavioral ecological 
and evolutionary hypotheses of anxiety-like behavior may be tested. Keywords: construct validity, animal models of anxiety, 
evolution, psychopathology.
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Introduction
In validation research, construct validity can be 
defined as an ontological statement about a property of 
some test which defines the test as valid for measuring an 
attribute if (a) the attribute exists and (b) variations in the 
attribute causally produce variation in the measurement 
outcomes (Borsboom, Mellenbergh, & van Heerden, 
2004; Willner, 1991). In psychopharmacology and 
experimental psychopathology, most studies involve the 
use of behavioral tests in non-human animals:
“Animal models represent experimental preparations developed 
in one species for the purpose of studying phenomena occurring 
in another species. In the case of animal models of human 
psychopathology one seeks to develop syndromes in animals 
which resemble those in humans in certain ways in order to study 
selected aspects of human psychopathology. (McKinney, 1984)”
This “resemblance” of animal models to human 
psychopathological processes is what is usually 
termed “face validity”. However, there is one 
important limitation to the attempt to establish face 
validity as a point-to-point correspondence between a 
disorder and an animal model, viz., the fact that there 
is no good reason to suppose that a given condition 
will manifest itself in identical ways in different 
species (Hinde, 1976). The decision that different 
behaviors in different species reflect manifestations 
of a similar underlying process is a problem for 
construct validity.
Behavioral models of anxiety try to tackle this 
problem by invoking the position of its construct – 
anxiety – in a nomological network that involves 
ecology and evolution. The theoretical rationale is 
quite straightforward: anxiety is a pattern of behavior 
that was selected for its importance in avoiding 
distantly or potentially risky situations (D.C. 
Blanchard & Blanchard, 1988; R.J. Blanchard & 
Blanchard, 1986; Brown, Kotler, & Bouskila, 2001; 
Brown, Landre, & Gurung, 1999; McNaughton & 
Corr, 2004; Rodgers, Cao, Dalvi, & Holmes, 1997). 
What is observed in behavioral models, such as the 
elevated plus-maze (Hoggs, 1996), the murine light/
dark box test (Bourin & Hascöet, 2003), and the open 
field (Simon & Soubrie, 1979), is the instantiation of 
an internal state of anxiety that represents species-
specific defensive behavior.
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Appetites and aversions as constituents 
of behavior: Fear and anxiety in a 
neuroethological perspective
Even though fear and anxiety are sometimes “lumped 
together” as variations in the same theme (eg., Panksepp, 
1998), they represent different aspects of defensive 
behavior (cf. McNaughton & Corr, 2004). The rationale 
for this distinction is based on the phenomenology of 
behavior and the neurobiology of emotion.
Fear is linked to a set of behaviors – defensive 
aggression, flight, and freezing – elicited by the 
presence of a predator. Those behaviors were initially 
defined ethologically, but respond differentially to drugs 
– they are affected by anxiolytic, but not panicolytic, 
drugs (R.J. Blanchard, Griebel, Henrie, & Blanchard, 
1997). Anxiety, on the other hand, is linked to a quite 
different set of behaviors (especially “risk assessment”). 
McNaughton and Corr (2004) postulated that the key 
factor distinguishing fear and anxiety is what can be 
called “defensive direction”:
“Fear operates when leaving a dangerous situation (active 
avoidance), anxiety when entering it (e.g. cautious ‘risk 
assessment’ approach behaviour) or withholding entrance 
(passive avoidance). [...] Also, in natural situations, there is a 
strong correlation between uncertainty of threat and the need 
to approach the source of potential threat. This correlation, we 
argue, has resulted in greater elaboration of anxiety relative 
to fear at the higher levels. (McNaughton & Corr, 2004)”
Defensive behavior, in McNaughton’s and Corr’s 
(2004) theory, results from the superimposition 
on defensive direction (approach and avoidance 
motivations, as defined by Craig (1917) of “defensive 
distance” (immediacy versus potentiality of threat; 
R.J. Blanchard et al., 1997). Defensive distance is a 
construct of intensity of perceived threat, a dimension 
controlling the type of defensive behavior observed 
in a given situation. Defensive behavior, then, can be 
understood as a tessellation in a two-dimensional array 
of defensive distance and defensive direction. In the 
case of defensive avoidance, the smallest defensive 
distances result in defensive aggression, intermediate 
defensive distances result in freezing and flight, 
and very great defensive distances result in normal 
non-defensive behavior. In defensive approach, 
defensive quiescence occurs at the closest defensive 
distances, risk assessment at intermediate defensive 
distances, and normal non-defensive behavior at 
very great defensive distances. It is postulated 
(Deakin & Graeff, 1991; McNaughton & Corr, 2004) 
that defensive avoidance is mediated by a putative 
fight-flight-freeze system (FFFS) – composed of 
anterior cingulate cortex, diverse amygdaloid nuclei, 
ventromedial hypothalamus, and periaqueductal gray 
–, while defensive approach is mediated by a putative 
behavioral approach system (BAS) – composed of 
pre-frontal cortex, ventral striatum, ventral pallidum, 
and ventral tegmental area. The behavioral approach 
system is more generally involved in approach 
motivation and foraging, “energizing” the organism in 
its search for fundamental resources (Panksepp, 1998). 
Serotoninergic and noradrenergic fibers that mediate 
global threat sensitivity modulate all the structures 
controlling defense (Deakin & Graeff, 1991).
In this model, anxiety is the result of conflict between 
two motivations – approach and avoidance – and is 
likely to appear whenever the organism must explore 
its environment in search of fundamental resources, 
but is subject to potential predation (McNaughton & 
Corr, 2004). The theory also postulates that anxiety 
is controlled by a behavioral inhibition system (BIS), 
which is, to some extent, parallel with the FFFS, but 
provides a range of functions when conflict ensues. 
The BIS inhibits ongoing behavior, increasing attention 
(environmental scanning, risk assessment and memory 
scanning) and arousal. The prototypical behavioral 
output of this system is risk assessment, which:
“… can be seen as supporting the functions of the decision 
mechanism that would normally select approach or avoidance 
behaviour but which is incapable of doing so during conflict 
when (by definition) approach and avoidance are balanced. It 
gathers the information necessary to tip the balance in favour 
of approach (if the threat proves less than initially perceived) or 
avoidance (if the threat proves greater) [...].
[...] As far as the decision mechanism that selects approach 
or avoidance is concerned, detection of conflict by the BIS has 
three distinct effects: it suppresses approach and avoidance; it 
increases the tendency to avoid [...]; and it elicits risk analysis 
behaviour. By contrast, the arousal mechanism that summates the 
intensity of approach and avoidance motivation has its activity 
potentiated rather than suppressed by conflict via the ‘increase 
arousal’ output of the BIS. (McNaughton & Corr, 2004)”
Thus, fear and anxiety can be understood in a 
two-dimensional approach: the first dimension is the 
motivational approach-avoidance distinction, while 
the second dimension is the essentially hierarchical 
organization of the systems controlling fear and anxiety 
in both functional (in terms of defensive distance) and 
neural (in terms of rostro-caudal level) terms. The 
different levels of each system and the two systems as 
a whole are heavily interconnected, allowing parallel 
control by both “quick and dirty” and “slow and 
sophisticated” systems and rapid switching between 
approach and avoidance as conditions change. This 
model postulates that the neural control of approach and 
avoidance is determined by the ecological conditions of 
the environment, as we will now briefly review.
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The ecological context of anxiety
Kavaliers and Choleris (2001) noted that the 
responses of prey to predators and various predator 
avoidance and antipredator behaviors have been 
extensively evaluated from ecological and ethological 
perspectives, as well as in ethopharmacological and 
neuroscientific approaches. Behavioral ecological 
models of motivational conflict parallel the current 
theories in experimental psychopathology of anxiety 
reviewed in the previous section, and postulate that 
natural selection designed animals to choose the 
behavioral option which maximizes fitness, which 
involves trade-offs between the benefits of avoiding 
predation (or other threat) and the cost of doing so 
in terms of optimization of feeding, reproduction or 
survival (Abrams, 1986; Brown, et al., 2001; Brown, 
et al., 1999; Lima, 1998; Lima & Dill, 1990). For 
example, sticklebacks’ (Gasterosteus aculeatus) refuge 
use presents phenotypic plasticity, and is a function 
of predation risk and body-length related metabolic 
expenditure (Krause, Loader, McDermott, & Ruxton, 
1998). In general, large fish emerges later from a refuge 
than small ones and spend shorter times outside the 
refuge; the relative weight loss of individual fish due to 
food deprivation is correlated with a reduction in hiding 
time even in the absence of body length differences. A 
behavioral ecological approach to risk assessment can 
be constructed as follows:
“Predation carries a much higher risk than that of 
temporarily losing food, water or a mate. A single predator-
prey interaction can have considerable influence on the fitness 
of a prey individual – one mistake and the prey animal may 
be eliminated. As such, the avoidance of predators and the 
exact evaluation of predation risk are highly favored by 
natural selection. Therefore, one expects that there would be 
strong selection pressure on risk assessment and the ability to 
distinguish between predator cues that indicate a high risk of 
threat and those that do not. (Kavaliers & Choleris, 2001)”
In behavioral ecology, this is usually modeled 
using the construct of “antipredator apprehension”, a 
motivational state defined as a reduction in attention to 
other activities (such as foraging and mate seeking) as 
a result of enhanced allocation of attention to detection 
and avoidance of potential predators (Brown, et al., 
2001); the behavioral output of this state is “vigilance”, 
a behavioral state involving alertness and scanning 
for prey. For example, gerbils (Gerbillus allenbyi and 
Gerbillus pyramidum) change their behavior from 
“blind foraging” to no feeding and total vigilance, 
through a phase of low feeding and increased scanning 
behavior (Abramsky, Strauss, Subach, Kotler, & 
Reichman, 1996; Dall, Kotler, & Bouskila, 2001). This 
“apprehension continuum” is reminiscent of the concept 
of defensive distance from the ethopharmacological 
literature: when the risk is high (i.e., when the defensive 
distance is small), animals adopt safer tactics (defensive 
aggression, refuge use, escape); when the risk is low 
(i.e., when the defensive distance is intermediate to 
great), animals tend to be more flexible in their behavior 
(risk assessment, normal non-defensive behavior). 
Intermediate levels of risk – that is, uncertainty about the 
existence or location of predators – leads animals to adopt 
a baseline level of apprehension, which is analogous 
to “risk assessment” behavior in behavioral models of 
anxiety. Behavioral ecology predicts that this baseline 
level is dependent on the number of prey individuals, 
their individual state, feeding rate, and number and 
characteristics of the predators or predator-associated 
cues. This is apparent in the exploratory behavior of 
rodents in areas in which a predator was present (R.J. 
Blanchard & Blanchard, 1989; R.J. Blanchard et al., 
1995; Molewijk, van der Poel, & Olivier, 1995; Pinel 
& Mana, 1989): rats (Rattus novergicus) and mice (Mus 
musculus) cautiously approach an area where a predator 
(usually, a cat) has briefly been presented, emitting 
responses which are characterized by scanning of the 
danger area from refuges (tunnel openings), “stretched 
attend” postures directed towards the danger area, 
and cautious locomotion upon initial re-entry into the 
danger area (Apfelbach, Blanchard, Blanchard, Hayes, 
& McGregor, 2005). In the elevated plus-maze, the 
“stretched attend” posture and sniffing behavior loads 
as “risk assessment” behavior in mice (Rodgers et al., 
1992), which points to the generality of this component 
across situations. Another example comes from the 
literature in alarm reactions of fishes: fathead minnows 
present altered foraging behavior in the presence of 
an “alarm pheromone” released by co-specifics, and 
this response is altered by chlordiazepoxide, a classic 
benzodiazepine (Rehnberg, Bates, Smith, Sloley, & 
Richardson, 1989).
The conflict between the fight-flight-freeze system 
and the behavioral approach system (i.e., anxiety) can 
be understood in this ecological paradigm:
“The various levels of apprehension lead prey to select a certain 
optimal level of vigilance that is staying alert (i.e.. scanning 
behavior, head up) so as to detect an approaching enemy, in 
response to their perceptions of a predator’s whereabouts [...]. It 
is the baseline of apprehension that determines the prey’s level of 
vigilance in the absence of any tangible evidence of a predator’s 
presence. If prey set their level of apprehension too high, they 
may miss valuable feeding or mating opportunities, while if they 
set it too low they are likely to be killed by the predator. Gain and 
risk must trade off so that the largest gain comes at the expense of 
the lowest risk. (Kavaliers & Choleris, 2001)”
Blanchard and Blanchard (1984) proposed that 
emotions provide the proximate mechanism for the cost/
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benefit analyses required by the conflicting demands of 
such situations, with the “strength” of these emotions 
depending on both the specifics of the eliciting situation 
and relevant internal features of the animal (e.g., hormonal 
status, hunger, previous learning). A similar interpretation 
was made by Brown et al. (1999; 2001), which considered 
how foraging animals should balance the conflicting 
demands for food and safety. To be considered in the 
outcome of this process are the choice of food patch, 
time spent in the food patch, choice of overall foraging 
location, and selection of a metabolically appropriate diet 
in relation to overall predation risk. A simple index of the 
perceived risk of predation is the giving-up-density of 
food (GUD), the density at which animal stops feeding or 
searching for food. In gray squirrels, this density increases 
with increasing predation risk (Bowers & Brelanf, 
1996). Ground squirrels sacrifice food availability and 
quality and feeding rate for safety either by differentially 
allocating time among safe and risk habitats or by using 
vigilance while active within a habitat (Bachman, 1993). 
Lima (1998) proposed that animals adaptively 
overestimate the risk of predation to avoid the relatively 
high cost of underestimation. This is consistent with the 
predictions of McNaughton’s and Corr’s (2004) model, 
which states that the behavioral inhibition system 
increases the tendency to avoid, probably by increasing 
the “weight” of sensitivity to punishment (Corr, 2004).
In general, the predictions from behavioral ecology 
are consistent with current models of anxiety in 
experimental psychopathology research. Risk assessment 
behavior, the main output from the behavioral inhibition 
system, is consistently observed across species and 
situations, being context-sensitive (e.g, to perceived 
threat and/or metabolic status) and predictably altered 
by pharmacological manipulations (benzodiazepines 
and serotoninergic drugs in the rat elevated plus-maze: 
Pellow et al., 1985; benzodiazepines and serotoninergic 
drugs in the murine dark/light box test: Costall et al., 1989; 
benzodiazepines in the response to alarm pheromone in 
a foraging context in fathead minnows: Rehnberg et 
al., 1989; benzodiazepines in the novelty response of 
banded-knife fish: Corrêa & Hoffmann, 1999). There 
have also been some attempts at neuroanatomical 
characterizations of anxiety-like behavior (Duncan, 
Knapp, & Breese, 1996; Misslin, 2003).
This cross-validation from behavioral ecology and 
experimental psychopathology greatly increases the 
construct validity of behavioral models of anxiety. The 
construct of “anxiety” has been operationally defined as 
risk assessment behavior in a variety of conditions, and 
manipulations in the underlying systems that mediate 
this behavior causally create changes in the measurement 
outcomes: if one manipulates pharmacologically the 
brains of animals or if one changes the ecological 
context for behavior, variation in the final measurements 
ensue. However, the hypothesis that anxiety is linked to 
species-specific reaction defenses is also funded in an 
evolutionary perspective; to increase construct validity, 
approaches to the evolution of anxiety must be made.
Anxiety in evolution: microevolutionary 
processes and macroevolutionary patterns
Questions in evolutionary biology can be made 
concerning the ultimate patterns that emerged in 
phylogenetic history or the underlying processes that 
led to those patterns (Quinn & Dunham, 1983). Most 
evolutionary accounts of behavior – including the model 
of anxiety delineated so far – rely, directly or indirectly, 
on an optimality approach to behavior, in which the 
“adaptive” status of the behavioral trait in question is 
taken for granted. Ethoexperimental approaches to 
the neurobiology of anxiety, for example, assume that 
this trait is homologous in mammals even though this 
assumption is usually not checked. This assumption is a 
necessary condition for the very existence of behavioral 
models: the underlying assumption is that, since 
“animal models represent experimental preparations 
developed in one species for the purpose of studying 
phenomena occurring in another species” (McKinney, 
1984), the traits tested in these preparations must be 
homologous in the species involved. The very existence 
of behavioral models, then, depends on two assumptions 
about the evolution of a trait: 1) the trait in question is an 
adaptation; and 2) the trait in question is homologous in 
humans and the species tested.
The first assumption is very difficult to prove. As 
has been repeatedly stated (e.g., Gould & Lewontin, 
1979), adaptation is a special concept in evolutionary 
biology, and must not be inferred without sufficient 
evidence. To say that a given trait is an adaptation is 
to make an ontological claim about its evolutionary 
origin which states that the trait was not only selected, 
but was selected for (Sober, 2000). However, there 
are many ways in which a trait can evolve – including 
neutral, gradual change by random genetic drift, strong 
correlation with a trait that is selected by itself, and 
selection itself. This means that the simple existence of a 
trait in a given population or species does not imply that 
it appeared by natural selection. Take a simple example: 
in Actynopterigian fishes, the Mauthner-initiated fast-
start presents considerable variation among species 
(e.g., Eaton et al., 1977). One could hypothesize that 
these species differences are due to local adaptations 
to predation, such that each species occupy a different 
peak in an adaptive landscape. We have demonstrated 
(Maximino & Gouveia, 2008) that body length is a 
major constraint in the evolution of the components of 
this response. In further work (Maximino & Gouveia, 
Submitted for publication), body length was factored-in 
an analysis which correlated fast-start performance and 
trophic level occupancy, and a negative relationship was 
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found. Both results suggest that the simple “adaptationist” 
approaches to the evolutionary emergence of behavioral 
traits are not feasible, but there is some extent in 
which the variability of behavior across species can be 
explained by adaptation.
The same argument can be made of anxiety: 
since risk assessment is the outcome of the behavioral 
inhibition system, which is a consequence of co-joint 
activation of the fight-flight-freeze and behavioral 
approach systems, changes in those systems could be 
selected for, impinging on the activity of the BIS. As a 
result, risk assessment behavior would co-adapt to those 
changes, but would not be, by itself, an adaptation.
Caution on invoking adaptive explanations to 
behavior, however, do not imply that adaptation can never 
be invoked as an explanatory variable. In fact, it has been 
argued (Orzack & Sober, 1994) that a weaker version of 
adaptationism can still be maintained on ontological and 
epistemological grounds, viz., the assumption that natural 
selection was an important cause of the evolution of a trait 
in the lineage leading to some extant species or group of 
species. The question, then, turns from whether or not a 
given trait is an adaptation to what is the role of natural 
selection on the evolution of the trait.
How, then, can we infer adaptation? Two main 
lines of inquiry can be made to answer the question 
of the weight of natural selection on a behavioral 
trait (Garland, 2001): one can rely on phylogenetic 
comparative methods to analyze the state of the trait in 
closely related species; or one can rely on experimental 
evolution, performing selection experiments in the 
laboratory in order to assess the extent to which a trait 
can be changed by different selection regimes.
The modern phylogenetic comparative method starts 
with a phylogeny and contemporary trait values and then 
infers the weight of phylogeny on the extant state of the 
traits in the species compared. It has been argued (Garland 
& Adolph, 1994) that comparative studies should always 
be made with more than two species, because not doing so 
implies in severe logical and statistical problems. If one finds 
differences among two groups, the explanation that those 
differences are due to species differences is not necessarily 
true. Inferring adaptation from a two-species study involves 
the confounding of independent variables: the environmental 
factor (presumed selective regime) and species membership; 
variation in the environmental factor and variation in species 
membership are perfectly confounded.
Thus, at least three species must be used in a 
comparative study, even though such a small number of 
species is likely to generate low statistical power, since 
degrees of freedom for the analysis would be N -1 = 2. 
A well-controlled experiment, though, is likely to detect 
species differences even with small power. This is a 
promising approach for future research in anxiety: the 
development of elevated plus-mazes for rats (Pellow, et 
al., 1985), mice (Lister, 1987), guinea pigs (Rex, Fink, 
& Marsden, 1994), different species of vole (Hendrie, 
Eilam, & Weiss, 1994; Stowe, Liu, Curtis, Freeman, & 
Wang, 2005) and neotropical spiny rats (Manaf, Morato, 
& Oliveira, 2003), gerbils (Varty et al., 2002; Varty, 
Morgan, Cohen-Williams, Coffin, & Carey, 2002), and 
Syrian hamsters (Yannielli, Kanterewickz, & Cardinali, 
1996) is an advance in the direction of comparative 
studies of anxiety. Recently, a paper has been published 
comparing open-field behavior of 19 species of muroid 
rodents (Careau, Bininda-Emonds, Thomas, Réale, & 
Humphries, 2009) which examined the relationship 
between open-field exploration and basal metabolic rate. 
A similar approach was made in the study of scototactic 
behavior in teleosts (Maximino et al., 2007), and we are 
currently analyzing the relationship between activity 
and avoidance in the elevated plus-maze in some of the 
aforementioned species (unpublished data).
A second possibility of study in the evolution 
of anxiety is the use of selection experiments, “an 
underutilized tool” in experimental psychopathology, to 
paraphrase Garland Jr. (2003). The basic methodology 
of experimental evolution is as follows: a lineage is 
selected and reproduced over successive generations, 
and a selective regime is imposed. For example, 
individuals could be selected which were closer to the 
mean of each generation, imposing stabilizing selection 
in the lineage; Broadhurst (1960) and Hausheer-
Zarmakupi and colleagues (1996) selected individuals 
with high and low values daefecation (Broadhurst) and 
ambulation (Hausheer-Zarmakupi and colleagues) in 
open-field exploration, imposing directional selection 
in the lineage. Alternatively, one could introduce a 
selective pressure (e.g., the presence of predation) 
and verify its effects, generation-wise, on a variety 
of behavioral outcomes. Behavioral ecology predicts 
that the presence of a predator should be a selective 
pressure that generates animals which are increasingly 
more “shy”, taking fewer risks. This could be tested 
by introducing a predator as a selective pressure in the 
treated groups and scoring their behavior in behavioral 
tests, such as the elevated plus-maze.
An interesting approach was made by Ponder et 
alii (2007). The authors differentially selected mouse 
lines based on the extent with which contextual 
fear was acquired in a Pavlovian fear conditioning 
procedure. Through generations, both lineages differed 
in that animals that came from a “high freezing” genetic 
background were progressively more sensitive to 
freezing in alternative contexts (i.e., physical alterations 
in the conditioning chamber when the animals were 
tested in it) as generations were selected, but selection 
for “low freezing” did not change this extent to which 
stimulus control was generalized. On the other hand, 
selection for “low freezing” markedly altered freezing 
to the conditioned stimulus, whilst selection for “high 
freezing” had more subtle changes in this parameter. 
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More interestingly, differential selection for either high 
or low freezing produced strains which were different 
in their response to fear potentiated startle, exploratory 
behavior in the open-field and zero maze, and gene 
expression in the amygdala and hippocampus. One 
of these genes (CaMKII) was implicated in candidate 
gene experiments which analyzed anxiety-like behavior 
(Chen, Rainnia, Greene, & Tonegawa, 1994), as well 
as in the modulation of AMPA receptor channels in 
prefrontal cortical neurons by 5-HT1A receptor activation 
(Cai, Gu, Zhong, Ren, & Yan, 2002).
Concluding remarks
The increasing cross-talk between behavioral ecology 
and experimental psychopathology is progressively 
enhancing the construct validity of behavioral models 
of anxiety. Predictions from behavioral ecology can 
be tested by experimental psychopathologists, and the 
neural basis for the behavioral patterns observed can be 
identified. However, current models of anxiety link it to 
evolutionary statements concerning the adaptive value 
and phylogenetic conservatism of the traits in question; 
those statements are usually “taken for granted” and 
not tested, which tends to reduce their value in the 
nomological network that validates the construct. 
The very existence of behavioral models is dependent 
on the truth-value of statements about phylogenetic 
conservatism, and this should be evaluated.
Of course, if evolutionary predictions fail to hold, 
this does not mean the end of the whole research 
programme. We defined these predictions in strong 
ontological terms of adaptationism and phylogenetic 
conservatism. However, as can be demonstrated, the 
programme can still hold even if a weaker version of 
adaptationism (such as that championed by Orzack & 
Sober, 1994) is used. Also, the possibility of convergent 
evolution – that is, the appearance of the same trait 
in phylogenetically distant taxa – does not invalidate 
the research programme; it is only necessary that the 
underlying physiology is similar. As always, those 
questions should be evaluated empirically, and not 
on philosophical grounds. As a result, the theoretical 
approaches which validate the construct of anxiety are 
still far from the ideal, and research on the field is just 
now beginning to develop.
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